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Abstract 
 
Twelve stylized facts on the relationship between technology and employment are proposed in this 
paper as a summary of current trends, conceptual issues, methodological approaches and research 
results. They include the following: 1. Technology is shaped by social relations; 2. Technology 
saves human labour; technological unemployment is a serious concern; 3. In the digital age the 
nature and boundaries of work are changing; 4. Different technological strategies have contrasting 
employment effects; 5. Industries differ in their employment dynamics and role of technology; 6. 
We can see the employment impact of technology at the firm, industry and macroeconomic levels; 
7. Technological change is a disequilibrium process; demand and structural change matter; 8. 
Business cycles affect technological change and its employment impact; 9. The impact of 
technology is different across occupations and skills; 10. Labour market conditions are relevant, but 
employment outcomes are not determined in labour markets alone; 11. In emerging countries 
employment outcomes are jointly affected by technology and catching up; 12. Technology is an 
engine of inequality; profits benefit more than wages, wage disparities increase. They have 
important policy implications in several areas of public action. 
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Introduction
1
 
 
The question of the employment impact of technology is as old as political economy. Every few 
years a wave of international concern arises on the ways the evolution of technologies – today those 
of the digital economy – affects the quantity and quality of labour in each country, its compensation 
and the prospects for growth and wellbeing. In this paper current trends, conceptual issues, 
methodological approaches and research results are combined in twelve stylized facts on the 
relationship between technology and employment. They identify in an effective way the key issues, 
help us understand a complex phenomenon, and may stimulate an urgent policy debate on the 
challenges our societies face in a variety of fields. The twelve stylised facts are the following ones. 
                                                             
1
 The stylized facts build on my previous works (Vivarelli and Pianta, 2000; Pianta, 2005; 
Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010; Bogliacino et al., 2011; Cirillo, Pianta and Nascia, 2018; Franzini and 
Pianta, 2016). I thank Valeria Cirillo, Dario Guarascio and Marco Vivarelli for continuing 
discussion on these themes. 
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1. Technology is shaped by social relations. Technology does not ‘fall from the sky’, it is not 
‘neutral’. It is a social construction largely shaped by the the logic of capitalism and by power 
relations in society. Scientific advances and human knowledge offer opportunities for technological 
innovation that may lead a nation’s economy and individual firms in very different directions. 
Research and innovation efforts at the technological ‘frontier’ are combined with the adoption, 
adaptation and diffusion of already available technologies, shaping a country’s growth trajectory. In 
emerging economies choices on technology adoption are related to countries’ development 
strategies, relying on particular advantages in terms of knowledge base, capital stock, absorption 
capabilities, institutional and infrastructural setting, low labour costs, social and environmental 
conditions, etc. The technological solutions, the resulting economic activities – private or public, 
market or non-market -, the combinations required for the quantity and quality of capital and labour 
employed, the economic and social outcomes are the results of decisions of key economic players 
and government policies. Examples include decisions on knowledge generation, research and 
education, energy sources, transport and digital infrastructures, exploitation of natural resources, 
manufacturing technologies, health services, environmental and climate change effects, etc. As 
such, key decisions on technology should be the object of national policy debates and democratic 
political process. 
 
2. Technology saves human labour; technological unemployment is a serious concern. The 
history of technology is made of efforts for expanding human capabilities, replacing harder tasks 
and saving labour. In capitalism technology is embodied in the means of production and in the 
knowledge of workers. Since the industrial revolution of the XIX century, capitalism has developed 
machines and technologies that could replace human labour, reducing wage costs, accumulating 
capital and generating more profits. Technological unemployment is therefore a serious concern, 
rooted in the nature of capitalist production. The actual relevance of technological unemployment in 
particular times and places depends on the of dynamics of development and on the rules and 
institutional arrangements on working time; in phases of expansion compensating mechanisms and 
public policies may offset job losses associated to technological change. 
 
3. In the digital age the nature and boundaries of work are changing. The evolution of 
technologies is best understood as a succession of techno-economic paradigms rooted in a set of 
major innovations that affect the direction of development. Since the 1980s we have seen the 
emergence of the new techno-economic paradigm based on Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs), based on rapid improvements in knowledge, computing and communication 
systems, digitalisation, networks and automation of production. In this digital age the nature of 
work is changing, in particular in many information-based and platform-run activities, from the 
media to the arts, from education to many private services. What is changing are the boundaries 
between market and non-market goods, between private and public goods, between work and 
(unpaid)  human activities, between waged employment and other forms of (somehow paid) work. 
Google, Facebook, AirB&B, Uber are major examples of businesses thriving on this 
transformation; conversely, Wikipedia and open source software are examples of on-line creation 
communities providing new types of public goods through cooperative unpaid activities. When we 
discuss the employment impact of digitalisation we should understand the importance of all these 
shifting boundaries. 
 
4. Different technological strategies have contrasting employment effects. There is too much 
talk of an indifferentiated ‘technology’ – affecting us all in a deterministic way – and not enough 
attention to the different technological strategies pursued by different actors pushing knowledge and 
its applications in sometimes diverging directions – just think of innovations in solar energy as 
opposed to coal and fracking technologies. Within a given firm, technology could mean the 
introduction of new products, new processes, new forms of organisation; we can identify on the one 
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hand a strategy of technological competitiveness where new products open up new markets, leading 
to job creation; conversely, in a strategy of cost (or price) competitiveness labour saving new 
processes and organisations are introduced, leading to job losses. A dominance of one or the other 
strategy leads to diverging employment outcomes of innovation. The measures we use for 
technology – and the interpretations we provide - have to identify this diversity. The diffusion in 
most advanced and emerging countries of innovation surveys on firms makes it possible to 
understand this diversity of technological efforts, moving beyond the limitations of R&D and patent 
data as technological indicators. 
 
5. Industries differ in their employment dynamics and role of technology. Employment changes 
are not the same in all firms and industries. Some expand and some decline, and technology usually 
plays a role. The high-tech/low-tech distinction and – in a more refined way – the Pavitt taxonomy 
of industries provide useful ways for differentiating the evolution of economic activities and 
employment pointing out the role played by specific technological activities. The empirical 
evidence shows that industries with higher technological activities tend to show better employment 
performances, although with many exceptions in particular countries and periods. Moreover, in 
different industry groups the innovation-employment relationship tends to take different forms, with 
the job-creating effect of new products stronger in science based industries and the job-destroying 
effect of new processes stronger in traditional industries. The consideration of this heterogeneity of 
technologies and industries provides novel insights into the innovation-employment link. 
 
6. We can see the employment impact of technology at the firm, industry and macroeconomic 
levels. Job changes can emerge, as a result of innovation, at the firm, industry and macroeconomic 
levels. Product innovation tends to have a positive job creating effect at all levels. Firms innovating 
in both products and processes, however, may be successful in expanding output and jobs, but often 
do so at the expense of non-innovating firms, with little net job creation. Industry and aggregate 
studies generally point out the possibility of technological unemployment, which emerges when 
industries or countries see the prevalence of process innovations in contexts of weak demand and 
low entry of new firms. In an open economy innovation may lead to competitiveness and exports, 
weakening the demand constraint or, conversely, domestic demand may increase imports when 
foreign competitors are more innovative in terms of price or quality; the job destroying  effects of 
technology tend to be intertwined to those of offshoring of domestic production. 
 
7. Technological change is a disequilibrium process; demand and economic structure matter. 
Mainstream economics is based on an equilibrium view of product and labour markets; technology 
is generally viewed as an exogenous factor affecting production processes; after a technology shock 
price and wage adjustments are expected to lead to a new labour market equilibrium. New growth 
theory has improved on this approach by assuming that in some firms innovation is endogenous and 
its effects spill over to the rest of the economy. Under these assumptions there is little room for 
understanding technological change and its employment effect. Conversely, disequilibrium 
approaches, combining Neo-Schumpeterian and evolutionary insights with the post-Keynesian 
perspective on the key role of demand and structural change provide the most appropriate tools for 
understanding innovation and its employment impact. 
 
8. Business cycles affect technological change and its employment impact. Schumpeterian 
insights have long stressed the connection between technology and business cycles. Both innovation 
patterns and jobs are affected by upswings and downswings. Expansions provide space for new 
products, new markets, new jobs; recessions bring new processes, restructuring and job destruction. 
The nature of the innovation-employment relationship changes from the upswing to the downswing 
of the cycle. Periods of major crises – such as the years since 2008 in Europe – are moments of 
major structural change when weaker firms and industries disappear, new labour saving processes 
are introduced leading to the loss of large numbers of low skill jobs. Only when new demand starts 
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an upswing in the business cycle, the opportunities for introducing new products open up again, 
bringing with them new job creation. 
 
9. The impact of technology is different across occupations and skills. Technologies are not all 
the same, nor jobs are. The quality of jobs – in terms of occupations, skills, educational levels, etc. -
has to be considered when we investigate changes in employment. Contrary to long held 
expectations of a technology-driven upskilling of work from blue collar to white collar jobs (skill 
bias technical change), what is emerging in most countries and industries is a more polarised 
employment structure, with larger numbers of managers, professionals and technicians, and more 
unskilled manual workers, especially in services. This trend also emerges when we look at the 
nature of ‘tasks’ performed (routine biased technical change) distinguishing between routine jobs – 
both cognitive and manual (such as those of clerks and factory workers) – that are easier to replace 
with computers, and non-routine activities (such as those of those of managers and gardeners). In 
this analysis, however, attention should be paid to the hierarchies in place – in terms of power, 
control over work and remuneration – and the occupational structure sheds more light on current 
change than a focus on ‘tasks’. These developments are the current manifestation of a fundamental 
characteristic of capitalism – its tendency to introduce technology in ways that allow less skilled 
(and lower paid) labour to be used. The emergence of a more polarised occupational structure has 
major implications for educational requirements and welfare policies, and is likely to be 
problematic in terms of wage levels, inequality and prospects for social mobility.   
 
10. Labour market conditions are relevant, but employment outcomes are not determined in 
labour markets alone. The importance of efficient and flexible labour markets as a tool for 
reducing unemployment is emphasised by mainstream approaches and policies; their view is that 
the impact of technology is more positive when firms easily find the desired quantity and quality of 
workers with low wages and moderate employment protection rules. In fact, the impact technology 
has on jobs is determined when innovations are designed and when labour demand takes shape, 
well before transactions on the labour market take place. Their role is clearly important in assuring 
an appropriate match between labour demand and supply in terms of education and skills levels; in 
finding wage levels that encourage productivity improvements and their appropriate distribution 
between labour and capital; in developing labour market institutions that may encourage innovation. 
The process of technological change, in fact, is shaped by social relations – including the balance of 
power between capital and labour -, that are reflected in the way labour markets operate. 
 
11. In emerging countries employment outcomes are jointly affected by technology and 
catching up. The construction of technological capabilities is a crucial component of the 
development process; it can be achieved through the acquisition and adaptation of foreign 
technologies; participation in global production networks organised by multinational firms; 
development of a domestic knowledge base and innovative potential. For many emerging countries 
the availability of innovation surveys comparable to European ones has made it possible to 
document the diversity of technological strategies that are carried out. A major trade off has 
emerged between the acquisition of foreign technology and efforts for developing domestic R&D. 
The employment impact is driven by complex and contrasting forces; the acquisition of foreign 
machinery may introduce the same labour saving bias found in advanced countries; once emerging 
countries reach some technological capability they may enter export markets with a large potential 
for job creation; catching up in productivity levels may reduce employment; achieving independent 
capabilities may open up the possibility to reap the job creating benefit of product innovation. Still, 
for emerging economies the structural problems are likely to be more serious, and the compensation 
mechanisms less relevant than in advanced countries, possibly making the employment impact 
more problematic. Four trajectories linking innovation, development patterns and employment can 
therefore emerge: Technological dependency; Imported technological capabilities; Integration in 
international technology networks; Independent technological capabilities. 
 5 
 
12. Technology is an engine of inequality; profits benefit more than wages, wage disparities 
increase. Income inequality has reached record levels in most advanced and emerging countries and 
is now a major economic and political challenge. In the last three decades in many economies 
national income has experienced a shift of 10 to 15 percentage points from wages to profits; 
productivity growth is leaving behind wage growth; poverty rates increase. The way technology has 
driven economic change is part of the problem; new product and markets allow large profits; new 
processes lead to job losses and lower wages; more precarious jobs and lower employment 
protection reduce labour costs; digital platforms allow new forms of low-wage work outside labour 
contracts. In most countries policies – on technology, trade, industry, labour markets, taxation, 
welfare expenditure, etc. - have favoured such increase in disparities, resulting in major economic 
and political problems. Even the OECD now acknowledges that “when income inequality rises, 
economic growth falls”. Radically new policies should ensure that labour may benefit from 
innovation and productivity in the forms of higher wages, lower working hours and improved 
working conditions. 
 
1. Technology is shaped by social relations 
 
The first stylised fact we propose is a way to conceptualise technology that has to be made explicit 
before the investigation of its economic and employment impact. Much economic research treats 
technology as exogenous, often with the (unrealistic) properties of a public good. In fact technology 
itself deserves a close investigation, identifying the mix of public and private knowledge that 
supports its development. Studies on particular technologies, on discoveries, inventions and the 
introduction and diffusion of particular innovations have shown the complexity and uncertainty of 
such processes. Existing technologies have been shaped by institutional and social contexts, 
government policies, business strategies, technology push and demand pull effects. Different 
countries and firms have often made different technological choices in their investment in particular 
industries, in the hope to become the ‘standard’ and the dominant market player. Just think of the 
current choices world automobile firms face on the source of power – gasoline, diesel, gas, 
electricity, hybrid, or hydrogen. Mistakes and failure are the rule rather than the exception. The 
process of ‘creative destruction’ identified by Joseph Schumpeter is an effective tool for 
understanding such developments. 
In exploring the employment impact of technology our starting point has to be a view of technology 
as a  social construction, shaped by the logic of capitalism and by power relations in society.  
 
2. Technology saves human labour; technological unemployment is a serious concern 
 
Stylized fact 2 deals with the fundamental economic function of technology. While technology has 
always been developed with the aim to expand human capabilities, in capitalism the introduction of 
machines and successive waves of technologies have followed a specific logic. Technology is 
embodied in the means of production and in the knowledge of workers; machines are generally 
designed to save and expand the reach of human labour, reducing wage costs, allowing greater 
capital accumulation and higher profits.  
For two centuries, a major positive effect of technological change has been reducing the quantity of 
human labour required by economic activity. The average annual working time of workers has 
rapidly declined; in the last three decades, however, this reduction has stopped and has been 
reversed in many countries. Instead of distributing the benefits of innovation and productivity gains 
in terms of shorter working hours for all – with constant wages – we have less people working 
longer hours, while unemployment is high. This is the preferred outcome for capital, setting its own 
rules for the employment of labour; previous declines in working hours were the outcome of social 
conflict and political decisions, creating complex institutional arrangements and social rules 
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regulating the use of labour. The lack of political and social action on this issue is turning the 
liberating potential of innovation into a difficult problem of technological unemployment. 
The debate on these issues started with the industrial revolution. At the end of the XVIII century, 
James Steuart drew attention to the difficulty of reabsorbing the unemployment caused by 
mechanization, in spite of the positive effects from the construction of new machines and price 
reductions, and already envisioned a role for the government. Adam Smith linked the invention of 
machines to the division of labor and emphasized its labor saving effects. Jean-Baptiste Say had no 
doubts about the ability of markets to adjust, while Thomas Malthus emphasized the positive effects 
resulting from the strong demand dynamics experienced by England at the time. The optimism of 
Classical economists in the early XIX century contrasted with the impoverishment of the English 
working classes – industrial workers, small artisans, and displaced peasants – who had started to 
organize trade unions and to launch Luddite struggles against the job losses and deskilling brought 
about by mechanization. David Ricardo was convinced that the economy could compensate the 
negative employment effects, but in a passage in the chapter “On machinery”, added in the third 
edition of his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, argued that “The opinion, entertained 
by the labouring class, that the employment of machinery is frequently detrimental to their interests, 
is not founded on prejudice and error, but is conformable to the correct principles of political 
economy” (Ricardo, 1951:392). 
Karl Marx emphasized the losses for workers in terms of jobs, skills, wages, and control over their 
work resulting from the way mechanization was proceeding at the time and argued that 
unemployment grows as technical change displaces labor more rapidly that the accumulation of 
capital demands new workers. Marx viewed capital accumulation as a constant search for new 
production techniques and new products (a key starting point for the work of Schumpeter). High 
unemployment assures lower wages and greater control over workers; along this road, however, 
capital accumulation ultimately encounters the problems of finding adequate markets and demand 
(Heertje, 1973; Vivarelli, 1995, Pianta, 2005). Marx had clear that the textile machines of the 
industrial revolution in England had their employment impact at the global level, also on the cotton 
artisans far away in the British empire and quoted the British Governor General reporting from 
India in 1834-35: “the misery hardly finds a parallel in the history of commerce. The bones of the 
cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of India” (Marx, 1969, p. 389). 
The possibility of technological unemployment is therefore a fundamental characteristic of 
capitalism. In a global economy the expansion offered by new technologies and the dislocations 
they introduce on previous production systems may take place in different locations. The possible 
‘compensation mechanisms’ that may mitigate technological unemployment are discussed in 
Stylized Fact 6, where the macroeconomic dimension is addressed. 
Machines and technologies also require new types of labour, new forms of work organisation. 
Marx’s argument that capitalism has a tendency to take the control of the labour process away from 
workers and transfer it to machines, expanding the power of capital over labour has been made 
again by Harry Braverman (1974) in the context of Fordist-type mass production in the US, where a 
‘degradation of work’ could be identified.  
In the age of Information and Communication Technologies the potential for enriching or deskilling 
work has been pointed out by several studies. Adler (1992) found that both processes take place as a 
result of different strategies of firms, suggesting that “the use of new technologies will in general be 
more profitable when entrusted in to more highly skilled employees” (id. p.3) with broader roles, 
greater competences and continued learning. However, it has been argued that “there is a 
fundamental contradiction between the potential of computerization to enrich working life and 
increase productivity and the development of the technology in the pursuit of authoritarian social 
goals” (Shaiken, 1984, p.5) as management has often introduced new technologies and shaped work 
organisation with the primary aim to increase control over workers (see also Noble, 1984). The 
intensification of work is a frequent outcome, with firms pressuring workers to produce more effort, 
as shown by Green (2004) for the UK and Australia; this is the result of the increased possibility to 
monitor work through ICTs, the weakening or absence of trade unions and overall changes in social 
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relations and attitudes to work. In a recent book, Brynjolfson and McAfee (2014, p.10-11) argue 
that “rapid and accelerating digitization is likely to bring economic (...) disruption, stemming from 
the fact that as computers gets more powerful, companies have less need for some kinds of workers. 
Technological progress is going to leave behind some people, perhaps even a lot of people, as it 
races ahead”. Technological unemployment, in short, is among us, and requires a careful 
understanding of its mechanisms and remedies. 
 
3. In the digital age the nature and boundaries of work are changing 
 
Stylized fact 3 identifies key changes in the nature of work that are emerging in the digital age. The 
most appropriate concept for understanding the economic role of technology is that of techno-
economic paradigms (Freeman, 1981; Perez, 1983, Freeman and Louca, 2001). Building on the 
work of Kondratieff and Schumpeter, we can argue that capitalist development is characterised by a 
succession of techno-economic paradigms based on a cluster of core technologies with a major 
diffusion potential across the economy and with rapidly reducing costs. Steam power and the textile 
machines of the Industrial revolution were the key elements of the first techno-economic paradigm; 
the present one has emerged in the 1980s and is based on Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs), with a current acceleration in digitalisation, networks and automation of 
production.  
The way labour is used in our digital age differs significantly from the previous techno-economic 
paradigm of ‘Fordist’ mass production that had emerged in the 1940s and declined in the 1970s.  
ICTs and digitalisation have changed the boundaries between market and non-market goods, 
between private and public goods, between work and (unpaid) human activities, between waged 
employment and other forms of (somehow paid) work.  
AirB&B is turning a spare room in the house from a gift to a friend into a market good to be sold, 
requiring a new type of ‘self-employed’ work mixed with social interaction. Some market goods 
have been replaced by non market activities, with job destruction on the one hand, and free access 
to improved goods and services on the other hand – the creation of knowledge as a public good in 
Wikipedia is carried out by unpaid on-line cooperative efforts, as opposed to paid work for 
producing and selling the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Leisure-type communication by individuals 
has been turned by companies such as Facebook into a profitable activity exploited for advertising 
and market services. As new digital platforms emerge organising work for thousands of people – 
such as Uber for driving services - the nature of work changes, with an appearance of occasional 
‘self-employment’ and a reality of complete control by the platform corporation. 
In the European context much attention is now devoted to the ‘Industry 4.0’ perspective where large 
firms and government policies invest in accelerating digitalisation and automation of manufacturing 
and services, with important efforts in the areas of robotisation, ‘Big Data’, ‘Internet of things’, 
‘Cloud computing’ and ‘platform economy’. This model of digitalisation and automation raises 
major challenges to the future of work in terms of quantity and quality of jobs, education and 
training, employment contracts, career prospects, social security implications, union protection and 
broader social relations (Guarascio and Sacchi, 2016). 
 
4. Different technological strategies have contrasting employment effects  
 
Stylized fact 4 emphasises the heterogeneity of innovative efforts. The diversity in the possible 
trajectories of technological change means that the economic analysis of technology has to 
investigate the specific innovations that are introduced in the context of particular business and 
development strategies. This may concern a country’s growth trajectory, an industry’s evolution or 
a firm’s strategy. The Schumpeterian distinction between new products, new processes and new 
organisational forms in firms is crucial for identifying such heterogeneity. We have an innovation 
when a firm first markets a new product or introduces a new process; the road open to followers in 
the same industry (in other countries, too) is the imitation of new products (perhaps with 
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incremental improvements, and adaptation to new users’ needs); firms in all sectors may decide on 
the adoption of new processes or use of new (intermediate) products generated in other industries 
(and/or countries). The latter two lead to the diffusion of innovations throughout the economy, in 
both production and consumption. 
These types of innovation greatly differ in their nature, economic relevance and labour market 
impact. Product innovations (in both manufacturing and service industries) can be based on internal 
innovative activities as well as on the acquisition of new intermediate or capital goods. They may 
replace old products or may be designed in order to reduce costs, with little or no net effect on 
employment, skills and wages. On the other hand, new products meeting a demand with high 
elasticity may expand output, leading to job creation; may increase variety and quality, leading to 
skill upgrading; both developments may turn a part of the productivity increases into higher wages. 
Process innovations (including those in the delivery of services) usually replace labour with capital 
(often with new investment based on information and communication technologies), leading to 
efficiency gains and job losses. (Pianta, 2001, 2005). When the new products are investment goods, 
they represent a product innovation in the industries producing them, and process innovations in the 
industries acquiring them, with contrasting effects on jobs (Edquist, Hommen and McKelvey, 
2001). 
This heterogeneity of innovation can be summarised in different technological strategies (Pianta, 
2001): 
a. a strategy of technological competitiveness where firms or industries carry our R&D, introduce 
new products, open up new markets, searching for quality and technological advantages; this may 
result in job creation (if new products are not simply a substitution of old ones); 
b. a strategy of active cost (or price) competitiveness where new processes and organisations are 
introduced with the aim to replace labour, reduce costs, restructure production and improve price 
competition; this generally results in job losses. 
c. s strategy of passive cost (or price) competitiveness where no significant innovation is introduced 
and firms try to compete mainly on the basis of labour cost reductions. 
While in innovating firms and industries new products and new processes often coexist, it has been 
shown that it is possible to identify the dominant strategy that shapes employment effects (Pianta, 
2000).  
In order to identify this heterogeneous technological strategies, however, empirical analyses have to 
move beyond the use of R&D, patent data or the or the adoption of ICTs as technological indicators 
and use data from innovation surveys on firms, that are now available not only for Europe, but also 
for a large number of emerging countries (see Stylized fact 11 below). Innovation surveys (based on 
the OECD-Eurostat Oslo Manual and on the Bogota Manual) provide information based on surveys 
that are representative of the universe of firms that document the presence of innovation in 
products, processes and organisations; the expenditure for innovation (R&D, design, new 
machinery, marketing, etc); the objectives that are pursued (from opening up new markets to 
reducing labour costs); the barriers to innovation; the share of sales associated to new products and 
their degree of novelty (new for the firm only or new for the relevant market); the relevance of 
policies, and many other aspects.  
By using this approach it is possible to break down the view of an undifferentiated technology 
affecting employment and to test the contrasting employment effects of strategies of technological 
or cost competitiveness. A large evidence is now available on European countries showing that 
manufacturing and service industries where product innovation is important in driving technological 
competitiveness have positive employment effects. Conversely, labour saving cost competitiveness 
efforts lead to job losses. The employment consequences of product and process innovations are 
visibly different in terms of the ex ante objectives of firms' innovative strategies, in terms of ex post 
introduction of innovation by firms, and in terms of the specific impact on sales. (Pianta, 2000; 
Antonucci and Pianta, 2002; Mastrostefano and Pianta, 2009; Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010). The 
diversity of innovation in emerging countries is discussed below in Stylized fact 11. 
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5. Industries differ in their employment dynamics and role of technology 
 
Stylized fact 5 looks at the heterogeneity of industries in terms of their technological activities and 
innovative strategies. The distinction between high and low technology industries and firms is 
frequently used in order to identify activities where knowledge and innovation are more important. 
Figure 1 shows the long term evolution of value added, employment and labour productivity in 
high-tech and low-tech manufacturing and service sectors in five major EU countries. In high-tech 
industries value added has almost doubled between 1995 and 2007, with downturns in the crises of 
2002 and 2008-2009; employment has increased by about 25% only, with major productivity 
improvements. Conversely, low-tech sectors showed a value added growth of about 20% with a 
very modest dynamics of employment and productivity. The importance of innovation and the more 
sustained demand dynamics for high tech productions are clear factors behind these contrasting 
patterns. 
 
 
Figure 1. Value added, employment and labour productivity in high-tech and low-tech 
manufacturing and service sectors in five major EU countries (DE, ES, FR, IT, UK) 
 
 
Source: Cirillo (2016), OECD STAN data 
 
 
A more careful investigation, however can group manufacturing and service sectors in the four 
categories of the Revised Pavitt taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984; Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010) that provides 
a relevant conceptualization of the differences in the process of technological change by classifying 
firms and industries on the basis of their dominant sources of innovation, the forms of appropriation 
of technology and market structure. The four groups include the following: 
a. Science-Based industries include sectors based on advancements in science, where R&D is the 
main source of innovation such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, office machinery, R&D and 
business services. High technological opportunities are associated with a strong internal innovative 
effort. Together with specialized supplier sectors, they represent the most innovative sectors and a 
source of innovation for the whole economic system. 
b. Specialized supplier industries create specific products for users-industries, and these typically 
include machinery and equipment and consultancy services, with an active role for human capital. 
High levels of Research & Development expenditure (R&D) and a tacit transferring of knowledge 
among workers characterize a strong internal innovation process. 
c. Scale and information intensive industries include sectors characterized by large economies of 
scale, high capital intensity and strong relevance of organizational improvements such as motor 
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vehicles, rubber and plastic products, banking services. 
d. Supplier dominated industries include traditional sectors (including food, textiles, clothing, 
traditional services); they typically direct efforts towards the mechanization of productive 
processes; innovation principally sources from suppliers of equipment and materials. 
 
Figure 2 shows the rates of change of employment in Revised Pavitt classes in manufacturing in six 
major EU countries. Science based and specialized supplier industries – the most innovative ones – 
have some growth of jobs from 1996 to 2000, with a steep fall in the crisis of 2001-2003 and a 
recovery up to 2007. Scale intensive industries have stagnant employment up to 2000 and job 
reductions up to 2% per year in the following years. Supplier dominated traditional industries have 
continuing job losses reaching -5% in 2004-2005. Can we identify the specific role of technology in 
these contrasting trends? 
 
Figure 2. Rates of change of employment in Revised Pavitt classes in six major EU countries 
(DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, UK) 
 
 
 
Source: Lucchese and Pianta (2012), OECD STAN data 
 
When the analysis of the innovation-employment link is carried out separately for each industry 
group different mechanisms can be identified. Considering 38 manufacturing and service sectors in 
eight major European countries in 1994-2004, the following results have emerged. The (modest) 
expansion of employment in Science-Based sectors has been driven by new products and by the net 
entry of new firms, while labour saving process innovation has no significant effect. In Specialised 
Supplier industries weaker positive effects of new products and stronger negative effects of new 
processes have been found. Scale and Information Intensive sectors and the traditional industries 
grouped in the Supplier Dominated category have recorded net jobs losses that are explained by 
labour saving new processes and wage growth, while the increase in demand is the only factor 
supporting job creation (Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010). 
These findings suggest an important role of heterogeneity in industries – an even greater one can be 
found for firms – and point out the relevance of sectoral studies for identifying the specific 
relationships between innovation and employment. 
 
6. We can see the employment impact of technology at the firm, industry and macroeconomic 
levels 
 
Stylized fact 6 stresses a methodological point - the impact of innovation on the quantity and 
quality of employment can be assessed at the firm, industry and macroeconomic levels. At each 
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level of analysis we focus on a specific context and approach and we can shed light on different 
relationships (Pianta, 2005). 
 
The firm level. The most direct employment impact of innovation is found in the firms that 
introduce them; the available evidence suggests that firms innovating in products, but also in 
processes, grow faster and are more likely to expand their employment than non-innovative ones, 
regardless of industry, size or other characteristics. In the case of new products the job creating 
effect is associated to expanded output. In the case of new processes, the resulting productivity 
gains may lead to price reductions, larger market shares, higher output, requiring new employees. 
However, firm level studies cannot identify whether the gains of innovating firms are made at the 
expense of competitors (the business stealing effect), or whether there is a net expansion in overall 
jobs. Moreover, firm level studies are frequently carried out on panels that are not representative of 
the universe of firms; they tend to focus on manufacturing firms alone; entry or exit of firms left 
outside the panel may account for a large part of employment change; in this context generalising 
the results of firm level studies may be problematic.  
 
The industry level. Industry level studies can account for the direct effects in firms and for the 
indirect impact within industries, including the competitive redistribution of output and jobs from 
low to high innovation intensive firms, and the evolution of demand (and therefore output and jobs) 
resulting from the lower prices due to innovation, given the price elasticities of the industry’s 
goods. The industry level allows to differentiate between the variety of technological regimes and 
strategies and, on the other hand, to bring in the demand dynamics of specific sectors, taking into 
account country differences in economic structures. Innovation generally has a net job creating 
effect in those manufacturing and service industries showing high demand growth and an 
orientation towards product  innovation, while a dominance of new processes may result in job 
losses. The overall employment effect of technology depends on the countries and periods 
considered, but in general is more positive the higher demand growth and the industry’s 
technological level, the greater the entry dynamism of new firms, and the orientation toward new 
products. Differently from the analysis of firms, whose demand is expected to be highly elastic, an 
industry's demand is constrained by the (relatively slow) evolution of domestic and foreign demand; 
countries with a greater economic dynamism are likely to receive a disproportionate part of the 
employment benefits of technology, leaving to countries with lower innovation the burden of 
greater job losses. It should be pointed out that in this regard service industries do not differ 
substantially from manufacturing (Evangelista and Savona, 2002, 2003). 
 
The macroeconomic level. The most complete view of the employment impact of innovation is 
provided by a macroeconomic perspective that can integrate all the indirect effects through which 
technological change affects employment – changes in prices and quantities of goods; shifts in 
demand patterns, investment capability and interest rates; differences in international openness of 
the economy; changes in wages and amount of jobs.  
This is the approach typical of the debate on “compensation mechanisms”; a comprehensive 
investigation on their relevance has been carried out by Vivarelli (1995; Simonetti at al. 2000). The 
compensation mechanism via decrease in prices has emerged as the most important one: new 
technologies may make lower prices possible, increasing international competitiveness and output, 
offsetting job losses due to the original innovation. This outcome, however, is contingent on the 
lack of demand constraints, on the decision of firms to transfer in lower prices the productivity 
gains due to the innovation, and on the lack of oligopolistic power in the relevant markets (Sylos 
Labini, 1969). 
The compensation mechanism via new machines may create jobs in the industries in which the new 
means of production are made, responding to the increased demand for equipment by users. 
However, the rationale for mechanization is by definition saving on the overall use of labor, putting 
a limit on the relevance of this mechanism. 
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The compensation mechanism via new investment argues that the temporary extra profits available 
to the innovator may be turned into new investment if profit expectations are favourable (and 
assuming that Say's law operates); this, however, may expand production capacity and jobs, or may 
introduce additional labour saving effects. 
The compensation mechanism via decrease in wages is typical of the neoclassical view of the labor 
market. As technological unemployment appears, wages should fall and firms should hire more 
workers. This mechanism, however, is based on strong assumptions as to the feasibility of any 
combination of labor and capital, competitive markets, flexibility of wages, and labor markets.  
The compensation mechanism via increase in incomes operates in the opposite way, through the 
increased demand associated with the distribution of part of the gains from innovation through 
higher wages, as has happened in large, oligopolistic firms in mass production industries. However, 
any wage increases can hardly be large enough to sustain additional aggregate demand. 
Finally new products may lead to new economic activities and new markets (welfare effects) or, on 
the other hand, they may simply replace existing goods (substitution effect); in a dynamic economy, 
- such as the US - this effect could be significant (Vivarelli, 1995). While this approach is the most 
comprehensive and satisfactory for explaining the overall impact of technological change on 
employment, the complexity of the construction of the model, the problems in specifying all 
relevant relationships, and the lack of adequate data limit the feasibility of this approach.  
 
Simulation studies. The employment impact of innovation has also been studied through the use of 
a simulation approach. Leontief and Duchin (1986) have found that the diffusion of computer 
technology and automation in the US economy would have negative employment effects; their 
analysis was based on an input-output model incorporating strong assumptions on the productivity-
enhancing effects of process innovation, but no demand dynamics. A general equilibrium model 
with a sectoral structure, which assumes full employment, has been used for simulating the 
employment impact of different scenarios of technology-based productivity growth and of the 
composition of consumption, in a recent study by IPTS-ESTO (2002) on the European Union. The 
results show an overall positive impact on jobs, differentiated according to the alternative sectoral 
distributions of R&D and innovation efforts; the best outcomes result from the concentration of 
efforts in high technology industries.  
While they are interesting as explorations of alternative futures, the results of such simulations are 
weakened by the models’ inability to identify either technological unemployment (when general 
equilibrium or DSGE models are used) or most compensation effects (when input-output models 
are used), and on the arbitrariness of the assumptions on the diffusion and productivity of new 
technologies. 
 
In sum, technological unemployment can be detected at the industry and macroeconomic level and 
is generally associated to low demand dynamics, lower technological activities or high international 
competition in high tech industries, and a dominance of process innovations. In open economies the 
generally positive role of new products and demand has to be combined with the importance of 
national specializations, economic structures, and the intensity of international competition, 
resulting in winners and losers in terms of job creation. A large attention has also been devoted to 
the combined employment effects of technology and globalisation; offshoring of domestic 
production can have a similar job destruction effect as technology in advanced countries, creating 
jobs in emerging economies (see Stylized fact 11 on the latter). 
  
7. Technological change is a disequilibrium process; demand and structural change matter 
 
Stylized fact 7 moves to the level of economic theories, discussing how they have addressed the 
innovation-employment nexus. Mainstream economic approaches are based on an equilibrium view 
of product and labour markets; technology has long been considered as an exogenous factor 
affecting the whole economy with new production techniques that require changes in the 
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combinations of capital and labour. Price and wage adjustments ensure that equilibrium in labour 
markets is achieved; the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment may increase, but the presence of 
technological unemployment is ‘assumed away’ in this approach.  The ‘new growth theory’ has 
introduced some improvements with models where innovative efforts– proxied by technology, 
learning, and education - are endogenous in a subset of the economy and ‘spill over’ to non-
innovating firms, opening up the possibility of unemployment effects. In these perspectives 
unemployment is essentially considered as a labour market phenomenon, ignoring both 
technological unemployment and Keynesian unemployment – due to a lack of aggregate demand. 
Concern is mainly on the flexible operation of labour markets; downward changes in wages and 
labour conditions are expected to eliminate unemployment. Labour economists, in turn, have 
explained changes in employment and wages with main reference to the demography of jobs, 
macroeconomic factors, wage costs, bargaining modes and the flexibility of labour markets. The 
usual assumption is that of general (or partial) equilibrium of markets, that is, all output finds its 
demand, and all workers ready to accept the current wage find employment. Technological change 
is often reduced to new production processes (and new production functions), with models rarely 
envisaging the emergence of product innovation. When employment losses appear, they lead to 
downward adjustments in wages and a new equilibrium; when this is not achieved, responsibility is 
attached to the lack of flexibility of labour markets, with excessive union power or institutional 
rigidities, such as the minimum wage.   
The impact of technological change cannot be be understood within such a framework. Technology 
is by definition a disequilibrating process, long pointed out by Marx and Schumpeter. Approaches 
that have built on such insights include the following: 
 
a. Neo-Schumpeterian approaches have developed the concept of techno-economic paradigms, 
associated to long waves of capitalist developments. The rise of the paradigm based on Information 
and Communication Technologies creates and destroys a large amount of jobs; employment 
expansion can be expected only once the mismatches between the new technologies and the old 
economic and social structures and institutions are overcome, with a two-way adjustment. 
Innovation has to be adapted to social needs and economic demands; economic and social structures 
evolve under pressure from new technologies. New technologies need to be matched by 
organizational changes, new institutions and rules, learning processes, the emergence of new 
industries and markets, and the expansion of new demand. A long adjustment process is required 
and persisting mismatches can lead to unemployment (Freeman, Clark and Soete, 1982; Freeman 
and Soete, 1987; 1994; Freeman and Louçã, 2001). 
 
b. Evolutionary perspectives have argued that technologies improve through innovations that 
expand variety and through selection in market processes; the emphasis is put on change rather than 
equilibrium and the role of heterogeneity, path dependency, feedbacks loops is emphasised. As 
analytical tools simulation and models based on heterogeneous interacting agents are often used 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi et al. 1988). This approach offers an appropriate understanding of 
the process of technological change, but has not yet produced detailed studies of its employment 
impact. 
 
c. Post-Keynesian views of structural change emphasise the importance of demand in driving 
economic growth and the importance of a country’s sectoral structure; industries are assumed to 
grow or decline on the basis of the joint evolution of technology on the one hand and demand on the 
other (Pasinetti, 1981). A strong expansion of demand – both domestic and foreign – offers room 
for creating new economic activities and jobs alongside the job destruction resulting from 
technology; new products tend to be introduced in phases of expansion when they can more easily 
meet new demand. A country’s success in job creation, however, also depends on its economic 
structure, reflecting the relative importance of high and low tech activities and the type of 
innovations that are introduced (see Stylized facts 4 and 5 above). 
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The process of structural change, with countries' different abilities to contract declining industries 
and expand production and employment in emerging ones plays a major role in explaining 
employment performances. Better outcomes are found in countries with a greater activity in sectors 
with fast growing (at the world level) demand and output, and with greater ability to reshape their 
economic structures. Worse outcomes are found where a larger part of employment is in industries 
more exposed to the negative impact of labour-saving technological change and globalization, and 
where more rigidities exist in the economic structure. 
Over the past three decades in this regard Europe and the US have evolved along opposite patterns. 
The Unites States has experienced faster growth of population, labour supply and GDP than 
Europe, with the expansion of new sectors based on product and service innovations, in more 
competitive labour markets where less regulation on minimum wages and union power are found. 
This has resulted in a faster growth of new jobs (compared to Europe) at the top and bottom end of 
the skill structure, and this polarisation has been amplified in terms of wage inequalities by the 
lower regulation of US labour markets. Conversely, in Europe lower demand and greater 
competitive pressure have led to a slower dynamics of GDP and jobs; this macroeconomic context 
has led firms to favour new process technologies that have significantly reduced low skill 
employment, with little room for new job creation; wage polarisation has at first been mitigated by 
stronger European rules on wage setting and employment protection, but in the last decade labour 
reforms in most EU countries have moved in the direction of more precarious work, lower 
protection and greater wage disparities. 
In the conclusions of our book ‘The employment impact of innovation’, writing in 2000, before the 
introduction of the euro, we wrote that “within the European Union, the current constraints on the 
expansion of demand, set by the terms of the European Economic and Monetary Union may turn 
out to be serious factors preventing the evolution of economic structures towards a direction more 
consistent with the potential offered by technological change” (Pianta and Vivarelli, 2000, p. 211). 
The low economic and employment growth of Europe since then – and in particular after the 2008 
crisis – confirms how important an expansionary macroeconomic policy is in order to capture the 
potential employment benefits of technology.  
 
8. Business cycles affect technological change and its employment impact 
 
Stylized fact 8 introduces the time dimension. Capitalist development takes place in cycles; 
expansions of production bring new jobs, recessions lead to job losses. Technology too develops in 
cycles; expansions provide space for new products, recessions bring new processes and 
restructuring. The effects of cycles can be huge, as happened in Europe after the 2008 crisis;  in 
2008-2014, more than 6 million jobs were lost in Europe (EU 28) and 4 million in Greece, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal alone. Figure 3 shows how uneven the employment impact of the crisis has been 
in the EU, with no net job loss in Northern EU countries, limited losses in Eastern economies and 
the heaviest impact in the countries of Southern Europe, where a significant job growth had taken 
place in pre-crisis years. 
Figure 4 shows the same cyclical effects for the occupational structure of major European countries 
(skills are addressed in Stylized fact 9 below); in the expansion more polarised jobs emerged; in the 
recession a major destruction of low skill blue collar jobs took place. These trends are accompanied 
by different technological strategies; in expansions new products may open up new markets and 
offer new jobs, while in recessions new processes may come to dominate technological change, 
leading to restructuring and job losses.  
The analysis of these cyclical patterns has been carried out by looking at the impact specific 
innovations have on jobs in the different phases of the business cycle (Lucchese and Pianta, 2012; 
Cirillo et al, 2018). Mainstream views include Real business cycles approaches, that have assumed 
technology shocks as sources of fluctuations in growth (Galì, 1999; Gaggl and Steil, 2007); 
endogenous growth studies assumed that downswings can stimulate productivity through a 
restructuring that eliminates inefficient firms (Caballero and Hammour, 1991, Aghion and Saint-
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Paul, 1998). As described by Stiglitz (1993), during upswings retained profits can allow firms to 
overcome the financial constraints to innovation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Employment change over the business cycle by country groups in Europe 
Average annual growth rates, percentage change  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Employment change over the business cycle by professional groups  
Average annual growth rates, percentage change, five major European countries  
(DE, FR, IT, ES, UK)  
 
 
 
Conversely, neo-Schumpeterian perspectives have emphasised the role of business cycles and long 
waves as fundamental aspects in the emergence and diffusion of technology. For Schumpeter, 
innovation is uncertain and discontinuous; expansion, in turn, is uneven and unbalanced 
(Schumpeter, 1934). For Mensch (1979), innovations are introduced in bundles during depressions: 
in upswings, firms can exploit rents from a higher demand for existing products; in a downswing, 
expected profits are lower and introducing innovations appears as a more attractive strategy. 
Kleinknecht (1982) emphasized the role of depressions in stimulating innovations, although the 
evidence is uncertain. For Freeman (Freeman et al, 1982, Freeman and Louca, 2001), depressions 
can increase incentives to innovate, but strong demand with expanding markets creates high 
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expectations of profits and important opportunities for the introduction of major innovations leading 
to the expansion of employment in emerging industries. Freeman also suggested that business 
cycles could have an impact on the type of innovations introduced in the economy; product 
innovation is associated to phases of strong growth, while process innovations seem to be “more 
attractive to entrepreneurs in periods of pressure on profit margin and during the downswing of long 
waves and even in depressions” (Freeman 1982, p. 4; Freeman and Louca, 2001). 
Recent empirical evidence has found that high technology sectors are particularly vulnerable to 
cycles, as shown in Figure 2 above by the higher fluctuations of employment in Science based and 
specialised suppliers industries, while scale-intensive industries have a higher degree of market 
power that can explain the greater stability in their employment patterns over the cycle. Findings 
have shown that during upswings the potential for Schumpeterian profits from major innovations is 
greater, and this favours the introduction of new products and the expansion of new markets. On the 
other hand, in industries where innovations are less important, the expansion of demand lowers the 
competitive pressure and the need to innovate; during upswings even less efficient firms may 
survive and profit. Conversely, during downswings, the lack of demand may discourage the 
introduction of new products and may increase competition based on costs and prices, leading 
industries to focus on new processes that lead to labour saving and cost cutting in the context of 
restructuring and exit of less-efficient firms. During upswings aggregate industry growth, as well as 
productivity increases, appears to be supported by both new products and new processes, as both 
technological and cost competitiveness may lead to output or efficiency improvements. During 
downswings new processes associated to restructuring appear relevant in containing the fall in 
economic activities, while new products and demand lose their importance (Lucchese and Pianta, 
2012; Cirillo et al. 2018). 
The structural effects of slumps should not be ignored; recessions disrupt the mechanisms of 
innovation-based growth and push firms toward a technological trajectory based on labour-saving 
new processes that increase efficiency but destroy jobs. Along with jobs, competences, skills and 
production capacity are lost during recessions, with the risk of setting the trajectory of growth on a 
lower path of development. 
 
9. The impact of technology is different across occupations and skills 
 
Stylized fact 9 breaks down total employment into different qualities of jobs, defined by skills, 
tasks and occupations. Within the mainstream, studies on skill biased technological change have 
focused on the complementarity between technologies and skills, predicting an increasing 
importance of skilled workers (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994; Autor, Katz and Krueger, 
1998; Chennels and Van Reenen, 1999; Acemoglu, 2002). A ‘race’ was also expected between the 
increasing demand for high skills due to the introduction of technologies and the supply of skills in 
the labour market (Goldin and Katz, 2008).  
In fact, what is emerging in most countries and industries is a more polarised employment structure, 
that is documented by the nature of ‘tasks’ performed (routine biased technical change) 
distinguishing between routine jobs – both cognitive and manual (such as those of clerks and 
factory workers) – that are easier to replace with computers, and non-routine activities (such as 
those of those of managers and gardeners) (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Autor and Dorn, 2010; 
Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2009; 2010; 2014). Routinisation has a 
strong effect on job changes; the effects of technology on skills are often mixed with those of 
foreign trade. In the case of US industries in the 1990s the job destroying impact of innovation 
appeared to be dominant, while international trade played a minor role (Berman, Bound and 
Machin, 1998). 
The impact of the Great Recession on jobs in the US has been recently investigated by a set of 
studies edited by Card and Mas (2016). Kroft et al. (2016) have shown that the large job losses of 
2009 have not been absorbed by new vacancies due to a slow demand dynamics. Moscarini and 
Postel-Vinay (2016) point out that – differently from past recoveries - small firms have failed to 
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restart hiring in anticipation of large firms’ behavior. The expanding trade with China – according 
to the results by Acemoglu et al. (2016) – has led to a 2% loss of US private sector employment 
between 1999 and 2011. Considering the skill structure of US jobs, Beaudry, Green and Sand 
(2016) suggest a de-skilling pattern in the occupational structure due to a contraction in the demand 
for skilled workers performing cognitive tasks, leading to a stagnation in their wages. Such trends – 
they argue – have been accelerated by the collapse of the US housing bubble. Therefore, high-
skilled workers moved down the occupational ladder and displaced lower-educated workers in less 
skill-intensive jobs, suggesting a de-skilling pattern in the occupational structure. Moreover, the US 
recession appears to have reallocated production to more efficient firms to a lower extent than in 
past downturns, with modest effects on productivity improvements (Foster et al., 2016). 
More solid and systematic evidence may come from data based on the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) that could be organised in four main groups: managers, 
clerks, craft and manual workers (see Table 1); these occupational groups are able to account for the 
employment hierarchies both in terms of education attainments and wages (Cirillo et al., 2018). 
 
Table 1. Occupational groups and educational level 
 
Occupational groups ISCO 1 digit classes 
Educational level 
(ISCED) 
Managers 
Managers, senior officials and legislators 3+4 
Professionals 4 
Technicians and associate professionals 3 
Clerks 
Clerks 2 
Service and sales workers 2 
Craft workers 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 2 
Craft and related trade workers 2 
Manual workers 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
2 
Elementary occupations 1 
 
 
Figure 4 above provides an overview – for the five largest EU economies - of the patterns of change 
of the four professional groups in the years before and after the crisis. During the upswing from 
2002 to 2007 employment growth has not reflected a general upskilling of jobs, but rather a 
polarising pattern has emerged, with expanding jobs for managers and for the lowest skilled manual 
workers, while mid-level skills for both white collars (clerks) and blue collars (craft workers) 
declined. This polarising pattern is particularly evident in services. The picture is different after the 
start of the crisis; a major destruction of blue collar jobs has taken place, with managers only 
increasing the number of jobs. Craft workers have a worse dynamics than manual workers, 
reflecting the expansion of ancillary jobs in low qualified activities (Eurofound, 2013) that is a key 
element of the pattern of polarization. Growth in managers is stronger in Spain, Italy and France - 
where catching up effects in the skill structure could be relevant – while increases in manual 
workers are found in Germany, Spain and Italy.  
Data for 38 manufacturing and service industries in five major European countries highlight the 
connection between nature of innovation and occupational group (see Cirillo et al., 2018). Figure 5 
shows that the share of managers in total employment is positively associated to the share of firms 
introducing an innovation (either new product or new process), with a wide dispersion due to 
industry and country diversity. Figure 6 highlights the negative association between the share of 
manual workers and that of firms introducing an innovation. Industries with greater innovative 
potential are characterised by higher skills, while those where manual workers constitute the bulk of 
the workforce have the lowest technological activities.  
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Figure 5. Innovation in firms and shares of managers in employment 
Averages 1999-2011, five European countries, 38 manufacturing and service industries, percentages 
 
 
Source: Cirillo et al., 2018 
 
Figure 6. Innovation in firms and shares of manual workers in employment 
Averages 1999-2011, five European countries, 38 manufacturing and service industries, percentages 
 
 
Source: Cirillo et al., 2018 
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Empirical investigations have shown that each occupational group is differently affected by 
innovation and other factors of change. Managers are the group that is most favoured by the 
introduction of product innovations, while process innovations negatively affect the jobs of low 
skill workers. It has also been shown that the impact of offshoring is parallel to the one of process 
innovation, with negative effects especially for low skill workers. If we investigate the different 
effects during the business cycle, we find that the gains in the expansion are concentrated in 
managers, while in the recession the largest losses hit craft and manual workers (Cirillo, 2016; 
Cirillo et al., 2018). These findings suggest that standard relationships between innovation and jobs 
are disrupted during downswings (Card and Mas, 2016). 
The hierarchical position of different occupational groups is not irrelevant for understanding 
decisions on innovation; this may contribute to explain the ability of stronger occupational groups 
(managers) to benefit from new product technology and preserve their jobs even during recessions; 
conversely, the weaker professional groups (manual workers in particular) have been hardest hit by 
job losses associated to new processes and to the restructuring taking place during recessions. These 
different outcomes are the result of how different professional groups are able to control decisions 
in firms, shape the type of technological change that is introduced, and protect themselves from 
potential threats in markets and technology, building on their bargaining and contractual position. 
 
10. Labour market conditions are relevant, but employment outcomes are not determined in 
labour markets alone 
 
Stylized fact 10 brings us to the labour market, where the number of jobs and wage levels are 
determined. For mainstream economic approaches this is the most important context for assessing 
the employment impact of technology. For the alternative approaches investigated above in this 
paper the key mechanisms shaping the innovation-employment nexus are operating well before the 
labour market stage – in the dynamics of technology and in the product market where labour 
demand takes shape. 
In the labour market, in fact, equilibrium is found simply moving along a given labour demand 
curve, encouraging at the same time a greater supply of labour, typically through education and 
‘active labour market policies’. Mainstream views emphasise the need for efficient and flexible 
labour markets as a tool for addressing unemployment, reducing union power, collective bargaining 
agreements, employment protection and minimum wage regulations. The US labour market is often 
portrayed as a model of efficient operation and in the past decade many European countries have 
moved in such a direction introducing labour ‘reform’ packages. In this perspective employment 
dynamics is expected to be driven by wage levels; business cycles have a role here as workers and 
unions reduce their wage claims in periods of high unemployment (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 
1991; Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996; Pissarides, 2009; a discussion of wages is in Stylized 
fact 12 below). 
Technology factors are largely neglected by these approaches; besides wage levels, mainstream 
views and policies have targeted ‘excessive’ regulations and rigidities as the culprit of the imperfect 
working of the labour market; a large attention has gone to the types of employment contracts (open 
ended or temporary; full or part time), hiring and firing restrictions, presence of labour rights, 
unions’ bargaining power, welfare conditions, etc. as factors that could prevent a more ‘efficient’ 
operation of labour markets. In most advanced countries policies have gone in this direction, 
leading to the decline of standard employment - full time, permanent jobs with union contracts, 
employment protection, social insurance and pension systems. The 2015 ILO reports has 
documented the rise of non-standard jobs and has showed that “over 6 out of 10 wage and salaried 
workers worldwide are in either part-time or temporary forms of wage and salaried employment. 
Women are disproportionately represented among those in temporary and part-time forms of wage 
and salaried employment” (ILO, 2015, p.13). 
In the alternative approaches for understanding the innovation-employment nexus discussed above, 
labour markets do play a role, but attention goes to the segmentation of labour supply and demand 
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on the basis of education and skills; on appropriate education, learning and training activities; on 
the way workers’ learning may support continuous innovation in firms; on employment contracts 
and their impact on technological activities; on the appropriate welfare protections that may reduce 
exposure to social risks and encourage innovation; on the way wages can capture a fair share of the 
productivity gains made possible by technological change (see Stylized fact 12). In fact 
technological change – as a process shaped by social relations (Stylized fact 1) – responds to the 
social and institutional constraints that emerge in a society; labour market conditions, rules on 
working time, labour rights and social protections are fundamental aspects of the way human labour 
interacts with particular technologies. 
 
11. In emerging countries employment outcomes are jointly affected by technology and 
catching up  
 
Stylized fact 11 addresses the specific conditions of emerging countries. The ability to introduce 
new technologies is now seen in developing economies as a crucial element in the process of 
industrialisation. Major efforts to introduce new products and processes, to imitate rapidly frontier 
innovators, to widely adopt new capital equipment and production technologies, to diffuse the use 
of new goods and services are now under way in many developing and emerging economies, from 
Eastern Europe to China, from India to South-East Asia, from Latin America to Southern Africa. 
This process is highlighted by the success of some Asian countries (most recently China and India) 
in shifting from a paradigm of technology adoption to one of domestic knowledge generation 
(Chadha, 2009; Altenburg et al. 2008; OECD, 2007), although the ability of other countries to 
follow the same road has been questioned (Sargent and Matthews, 2008; Perez, 2008).  
Such attention to technology has led to a rapid diffusion in these countries of innovation surveys, 
replicating and adapting the model first developed in Europe (Eurostat, 2008). The advantage of 
innovation surveys is in their ability to document the complex and multi-dimensional nature of 
technological change in firms (Dosi, 1988; Pavitt, 1984), offering a variety of indicators on inputs, 
outputs, sources, objectives and hampering factors. 
A detailed investigation has reviewed and compared the evidence from innovation surveys in 
emerging countries referring to the time period between 2002 and 2006 (Bogliacino et al., 2011). A 
summary of the main findings is provided below. Table 2 shows that in general EU-15  outperforms 
emerging countries in terms of innovative output, but the variance among the latter is very large. 
There are a few Asian countries – such as South Korea – whose performances are comparable or 
higher than the EU-15. Most emerging countries and countries or recent accession to the EU have 
innovative output that is moderately behind EU-15 levels. A few countries lag behind the EU by a 
substantial margin – such as Russia, Ukraine and Thailand. It should be pointed out here that data 
on innovative turnover refer to the share of sales of products that are new to the firm, including 
therefore both innovation and imitation; for example, Malaysia has a 42% share on innovative 
turnover, but the percentage which does not result from imitation is about 14%.  
Figure 7 shows the trade off between the two major priorities in the expenditure on innovation - on 
the one hand the prevalence of R&D, typical of countries closer to the technological frontier and 
engaging in original innovation; on the other hand the concentration of resources on the 
introduction of new production technologies (usually developed elsewhere) through the acquisition 
of new machinery and equipment. Countries in the process of industrialisation tend to devote the 
large majority of their technological efforts to the latter; this is the case of Latin America (with the 
exception of Brazil), Russia, South Africa, but also of the Central and Eastern European countries 
that have recently joined the EU. On the other hand, China, other Asian countries and Turkey have 
an intermediate position, devoting their efforts in roughly equal shares to R&D and new machinery; 
this shows that such countries are moving closer, at least in some sectors, to the European pattern of 
expenditure for innovation.  
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Table 2. Innovative output. 
Legend: M Manufacture, S services, KIBS refers to knowledge intensive business services. In 
column (2) the unit is the share of total firms, in column (3)-(5) the share of innovative firms, and in 
the final column the share of total turnover. 
      Product 
and 
Process          
(as share 
of 
innovative 
firms) 
    Share of 
turnover 
Countries Manuf. Share of 
Innovative 
Firms 
Product 
Only (as 
share of 
innovative 
firms) 
Process 
Only (as 
share of 
innovative 
firms) 
due to 
new, 
improved 
products 
  or      
  Serv.         
EU 15 M 48.9 45.2 21.3 27.7 10.4 
  S 41.5 41.7 22.7 30.7 6.3 
EU NMS M 30.7 48.2 22.0 24.9 11.5 
  S 23.8 42.0 23.0 28.1 11.1 
RUSSIA M 9.3    10.6 
  S 15.3       3.1 
UKRAINE M 11.5       6.7 
TURKEY M 35.3  25.1 25.0   
  S 24.6   16.7 18.5   
CHINA M 30.0 21.3 3.8 4.8 14.4 
SOUTH 
KOREA 
M  42.0 18 18 5 54 
  S 21.0         
MALAYSIA M 53.8   10.6 6.2 42* 
THAILAND  M 6.4  4.10 4.3   
  S 4.0         
TAIWAN M 39.6  27.6 27.2   
  S 32.4   23.2 20.4   
SINGAPORE M 31.7  24.1 22.4 29 
  KIBS 56.9   44.4 49.4   
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
M 54.8 38.4 11.1 3.5 13.7 
  S 49.3 22.9 12.7 7.3 7.6 
ARGENTINA M 41.7         
BRAZIL M 33.3    38.7 
  S 51.7       50.4 
COLOMBIA M 33.4         
CHILE M, S 37.9       24.9 
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Figure 7. R&D and acquisition of new machinery in selected countries. 
Data are expressed as share of total innovation expenditure. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the main objectives of innovation; strategies based on new and improved products 
may be linked to a search for new markets and a wider product range, while efforts focused on 
production processes may lead to greater capacity and flexibility, or lower labour and other 
production costs (again, data do not add up to 100 as they show the share of firms indicating each 
objective as relevant). Quality improvement appears as the dominant objective in emerging 
countries, associated to other product-related efforts; in parallel, innovation in processes aims at 
strengthening the productive capacity - especially in Asia and Latin America – with concerns on 
labour costs playing a more limited role. 
In the evidence above a systematic comparison between manufacturing and service industries has 
been provided. Results are generally consistent across different variables; innovative efforts and 
outputs tend to be stronger in manufacturing, with services following closely in most countries. 
Combining this empirical evidence (Bogliacino et al., 2011) and key insights from the existing 
literature – in particular Abramovitz (1986), Lall (1992), Freeman and Louça (2001), Perez (2002) 
and Nelson (2006) – the following patterns can be identified. 
In emerging countries technological change mainly takes the form of acquisition of new machinery 
and imitation of the products and processes developed elsewhere. Both technology adoption and 
imitation can spread rapidly among firms in emerging countries, with the benefits typical of 
catching-up processes.  
Innovation, however, requires resources and institutions; in emerging countries the gaps are not 
simply of a quantitative nature – the amount of R&D, of higher education, of high technology 
investment – but concern the nature of the national system of innovation, with a frequent lack of 
integration between firms in the production system, the financial sector, research and education 
activities and the policies of the public sector. The evidence on the sources of knowledge and 
obstacles to innovation points out the importance of building a coherent innovation system.  
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Table 3. The Objectives of Innovation.  
Legend: M Manufacture, S services, KIBS refers to knowledge intensive business services 
Data are expressed as shares of innovative firms 
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EU 15 M 37.5 33.0 28.5 26.6 26.9 20.4 12.3 
  S               
EU NMS M 32.2 30.0 24.9 25.9 22.7 13.3 11.9 
  S               
RUSSIA M 34.0 40.5 21.3  17.7 15.2 3.7 7.2 
  S 55.9 50.3 15.0 27.1 25.8 2.9 5.6 
UKRAINE M               
TURKEY M 83.4 76.8 74.2 79.4 78.4 68.1 55.0 
  S 82.1 70.0 77.0 77.4 76.5 54.3 42.3 
CHINA M 49.2 45.2 47.3 47.3 32.5 31.9 37.5 
SOUTH 
KOREA 
M  63.0 46.0 52.0 45.3 43.0    
  S 41.5 32.8 25.0   17.5 24.2 25.0 
MALAYSIA M               
THAILAND  M         
  S               
TAIWAN M         
  S               
SINGAPORE M 48.3 44.6 29.9 16.0 16.1 14.4 13.3 
  KIBS 43.6 25.1 17.8 22.0 14.5 2.2 2.2 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
M 48.3 44.6 29.9 16.0 16.1 14.4 13.3 
  S 43.6 25.1 17.8 22.0 14.5 2.2 2.2 
ARGENTINA M               
BRAZIL M 68.4 42.0 28.1 58.0 48.3 38.5 39.7 
  S 82.5 69.3 46.3 66.4 62.3 35.3 33.8 
COLOMBIA M 53.4 26.5 31.7 46.3 25.5 24.4 24.0 
CHILE M/S 51.8   60.1  59.1  59.1    59.1  
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Innovation is pushed by industrialisation and pulled by growth of markets. On the supply side, the 
dominance of new machinery among innovative expenditures and the importance of technology 
adoption suggest a close link to the process of  industrialisation. On the demand side, countries 
integrated in international production networks are able to diffuse modern production competences 
adopting new process technologies, finding expanding markets for products that imitate those of 
advanced countries.  
Being exposed to international competition favours innovation. When facing external competition 
firms tend to adopt technology faster, a result that has emerged also in advanced countries.  
However, this does not mean that developing economies automatically benefit from opening up to 
trade and foreign competition in all industries; where domestic capabilities are inadequate and 
dynamic scale economies are not yet reached, opening up may simply put domestic firms out of 
business, losing part of the production system. The search for a trade off between these 
opportunities and risks is a matter that should be addressed by national industrial policies (Cimoli et 
al. 2009). 
The affiliates of multinational corporations tend to be more innovative than the national average, 
another result that has also emerged in advanced countries (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006). This is 
linked to intra-firm knowledge flows and to the strategies by foreign firms aiming to exploit their 
competences and technologies in local markets. However, little domestic technological capabilities 
may be produced, the integration between foreign affiliates and local firms can be modest and the 
spillover effects in terms of knowledge, competences and productivity can be small.  
The main obstacle to innovation is its economic cost and the lack of finance, again a result also 
found in advanced countries. In emerging economies the absence of advanced and forward-looking 
financial systems is a major weakness of national innovation systems. 
Building on this empirical evidence, a typology of four trajectories linking innovation, development 
and employment could be proposed. 
 
a. Technological dependency is typical of countries with a small industrial base, where the main 
part of the economy is made up by agriculture or export commodities. Technology – in different 
forms – is generally acquired from abroad. The lack of a knowledge infrastructures prevents the 
exploitation of foreign technology, that remains difficult to adopt and imitate. The actual effects on  
productivity and employment may be uncertain. 
 
b. Imported technological capabilities are found when there is significant acquisition of foreign 
technologies by domestic firms through new machinery and learning processes, leading to new 
productions, but with no inventive capabilities. This pattern may be typical of economies that are 
resource intensive, commodity- exporting or at the first stages of offshore production; they tend to 
be unable to build a critical mass of domestic knowledge base. The acquisition of machinery may 
allow some catching up in productivity levels; however, alongside machinery they may import the 
same labour saving bias typical of advanced countries in very different employment contexts. 
 
c. Integration in international technology networks is the pattern typical of open economies with 
close links between foreign owned domestic firms and the system of international production of 
multinational firms. We can find here transfer of technologies, growing production capabilities and 
participation to innovative activities, mainly through the acquisition of new machinery. This may 
lead to positive innovative performances, but with a limited consolidation of the domestic 
knowledge base. The employment impact is driven here by export demand which could require 
large job creation. However, key decision on the types of technologies used may remain in the 
hands of the multinational firms controlling international production, leading to very different (and 
unstable) innovation-employment relationships. Recent evidence includes cases – such as those of 
Foxconn and Nike – of advanced robotisation strategies that may replicate in emerging countries 
the massive labour-displacing effects of advanced economies. 
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d. Independent technological capabilities is a trajectory characterized by the development of 
internal innovative capabilities and activities by domestic firms (ranging from R&D to design, 
imitation and adaptation of foreign know-how), leading to new productions for the internal and 
international markets, and the ability to compete with advanced countries at least in some product 
groups and industries. This is the condition of the largest emerging countries that face the challenge 
to extend and diversify their technological activities. The employment impact of such trajectory 
includes the job creation effects of new products in areas of national strength and is moving closer 
to the pattern discussed in the case of advanced countries. 
  
Elements of these different trajectories may coexist in different industries of emerging countries,  
with a complex interaction between technology, development patterns and job creation. However, 
for emerging economies the employment impact of technology may appear to be more problematic 
than in advanced countries; structural problems are likely to be more serious, and the compensation 
mechanisms could be less effective (Karaomerlioglu and Ansal, 2000). 
 
12. Technology is an engine of inequality; profits benefit more than wages, wage disparities 
increase 
 
Stylized fact 12 concern the distribution of the benefits of innovation between capital and labour 
and among workers. There is ample evidence that the current patterns of technological change have 
contributed to the unprecedented rise in income inequalities in most advanced countries (Franzini 
and Pianta, 2016; Piketty, 2013).  
 
Figure 8. Growth of labour productivity and average wages in advanced countries, 1991-2013 
 
 
Wage growth is calculated as a weighted average of year-on-year growth in average monthly real 
wages in 36 economies. Index is based to 1999 because of data availability. 
Data from ILO Global Wage Database; ILO Trends Econometric Model. 
From: ILO Global Wage Report 2014/15, p.8. 
© 2015 International Labour Organization 
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An effective way of documenting the loss of labour and the gains of capital as a result of 
technological change is provided by Figure 8, drawn from the ILO Global wage report, showing 
productivity and wage dynamics in the 36 largest economies since 1991. Innovation is a main driver 
of productivity gains; productivity growth has not been particularly rapid, with average increases 
around 1.2% per year, but wage increases have been left behind and are basically flat since 2009, 
with average increases around 0.4%. Wage increases equal to productivity growth are generally 
required if we want to maintain a stable distribution of income between wages and profits. The 
effect of technology on income distribution between profits and wages, and on disparities among 
workers is examined below. 
 
Disparities between profits and wages. In advanced countries over the last decades the functional 
distribution of income between labour and capital has seen a shift of 10 to 15 percentage points of 
national income from wages to profits, resulting in a major increase in inequality. Real wages have 
fallen for a large number of workers. The 2012 OECD Employment Outlook argued that the 
reduction in the labour share was linked to labour-displacing technological change, to a rise in 
domestic and foreign competition – including delocalisation and imports that replace national 
production – and to the reduction of public ownership through privatisations (OECD 2012, p.111).  
An investigation on the dynamics of profits and wages in manufacturing industries, covering ten 
European countries in the period 1994-2001 (Pianta and Tancioni, 2008) has shown that the real 
growth of wages per employee was less than half that of total profits. In high innovation sectors, 
profits increased by close to 8 per cent a year, three time as fast as wages. In low innovation 
industries profits growth was 3.5 per cent, again more than twice that of wages. While increases in 
labour productivity are the source of increased remuneration for both capital and labour, the conflict 
over distribution is a strong factor in explaining the relative gains of profits. Wages tend to grow 
faster in the sectors where innovation expenditure (largely due to wages for high skill researchers) 
is higher, while profits are driven both by the importance of new products and market power, and 
by restructuring through the diffusion of new processes and wage depressing job reductions. The 
lesson of such evidence is that technological change has the general effect of favouring profits over 
wages. Profits increase through separate mechanisms in industries relying on technological or cost 
competitiveness; conversely, wages grow only when innovation is associated to higher skills of 
labour; the result is greater inequality rooted in the functional distribution of income (ibid.). 
 
Disparities among wages. Wage inequality has significantly increased. A preliminary clarification 
concerns the remuneration of top managers that is often classified as ‘wage’ but in fact is part of the 
distribution of a firm’s profits. Even once we eliminate the rapidly growing compensations of top 
managers, disparities among wages are relevant along many dimensions.  
Across educational levels and skills, wages tend to be higher and grow faster for workers with 
higher education, higher skills or using computers at work (for reviews see Chennells and Van 
Reenen, 1999; Sanders and ter Weel, 2000; Acemoglu, 2002).  
Across industries we generally find that advanced services and high innovation manufacturing 
industries have higher wage levels and faster wage increases, even in the countries with a weaker 
technological dynamism. Conversely, low innovation industries tend to have a modest wage 
dynamics, with a wide spectrum of variation; these patterns clearly results in growing wage 
polarisation (Pianta, 2004, Galbraith, 2012). 
Innovative strategies also emerge as important factors. A study at the industry level, covering ten 
manufacturing and service sectors in seven European countries (Croci Angelini at al., 2009) has 
found that a higher wage polarisation is found in industries with strong product innovation, a fast 
employment dynamics and high shares of workers with university education; sectors with greater 
opportunities for expanding markets and jobs are likely to show increasing wage inequalities, as 
managers and high skill workers can obtain part of the rents from innovation. Conversely, wage 
compression is typical of industries characterised by the diffusion of new process technologies, high 
shares of workers with secondary education who can increase their competences and productivity 
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by working on new machinery, obtaining higher relative wages (usually in a context of relatively 
high unionisation and labour market regulation), leading to reduced wage disparities. 
Again, the effects of technology on wages are often combined with those of foreign outsourcing 
resulting in a stronger downward pressure on wages of low skilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 
2003; Bogliacino et al. 2016). 
However, the relationship between innovation and wages may also run in the opposite direction; 
low wages, precarious work and high labour market flexibility can eliminate a major incentive for 
introducing  innovation in  firms, resulting in worse technological performances (Kleinknecht, 
1998; Cetrulo et al. 2017). 
 
Labour market institutions also play a major role in the rise of wage disparities. In the last three 
decades all major international organisations – such as the OECD and the IMF - have asked 
governments to introduce labour market “reforms” going in the direction of more flexibility, lower 
employment protection and union power, based on the mainstream argument discussed in Stylized 
fact 10 that more flexible labour markets help reduce unemployment. Such policies have been 
introduced in a large number of countries, resulting in high wage disparities. A surprising reversal 
in policy advice has now emerged. The last OECD report on inequality (OECD, 2015) emphasises 
the responsibility of weaker labour market institutions in the rise of wage inequality. The report 
acknowledges that “declining union coverage had a disequalising effect on the wage distribution” 
and that “high union density and bargaining coverage, and the centralisation/co-ordination of wage 
bargaining tend to go hand in hand with lower overall wage inequality in both OECD countries and 
emerging economies” (OECD, 2015, p. 42; see also OECD, 2011). A specific attention is devoted 
to the rise of non-standard jobs that “can also be associated with precariousness and poorer labour 
conditions”, lacking “employment protection, safeguards and fringe benefits enjoyed by colleagues 
on standard work contracts”; the consequences are that “a non-standard job typically pays less than 
traditional permanent work (…). These earning gaps are especially wide among low-skill, low-paid 
workers: non-standard workers in the bottom 40% of earners typically suffer wage penalties of 20% 
(…). Non-standard workers also face higher levels of insecurity in terms of the probability of job 
loss and unemployment and, in the case of temporary workers, report significantly higher job 
strain” (ibid. p. 31). The OECD now advocates a minimum wage that “can help supporting low-
wage workers and low-income families while avoiding significant job losses (ibid., p. 42). 
A similar argument has been made by the IMF in a study (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) showing that a 
decline in organised labour institutions is associated to higher inequality measured by Gini 
coefficients, “likely reflecting the fact that labor market flexibility benefits the rich and reduces the 
bargaining power of lower-income workers”. Additional evidence shows that “more lax hiring and 
firing regulations, lower minimum wages relative to the median wage, and less prevalent collective 
bargaining and trade unions are associated to higher market inequality” (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015, 
p.26). 
The above evidence suggests the need for policies addressing the distribution of the productivity 
gains resulting from technological change. Over the past decades, innovation has mainly benefited 
capital in the form of higher profits, top earnings and financial rents in a context of increasing 
pressure on firms from investors demanding high financial returns. Conversely, technological 
change has often hit workers with job losses associated to labour saving new processes, with new 
forms of low wage precarious work, with stagnant real wages. Technology is one of the engines of 
income inequality that has now reached record levels in many advanced and emerging  countries. 
Such disparities are not only a problem of social justice, they also undermine the possibility of 
growth and efficiency – as argued also by the OECD: “when income inequality rises, economic 
growth falls” (OECD, 2015, p.60). New policies are therefore required for changing this state of 
affairs, for shaping technological change in the interest of society; for reducing its negative 
employment effects; for making sure that the gains from innovation and productivity go to labour in 
the forms of higher wages, lower working hours and improved working conditions. 
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